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1. SUMMARY: Appellants challenge a Washington 
statute that prescribes that "[t]he state conunittee of 
each majo:_political party shall consist of one com-
..... - ::--
mitteeman and one conunitteewoman from each county elected 
by the county conunittee at its organization meeting," 
RCW 29.42o020, on the ground that, by limiting the number 




2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: ' The Washington 
State Democratic Party is comprised of several related 
bodies. The~tate Party Convention is the supreme au-
thority; it meets every two years, has plenary authority 
over party organization and policies, and elects delegates 
to the National Democratic Party meetings. Between state 
conventions, the Democratic State Committee is the state-
wide governing body. It meets four times a year. Ap-
pellants and appellees agree that the State Committee makes 
intraparty rules governing the statewide operations of the 
party as a political organization between conventions and 
that it raises and distributes some money to party candidates. 
As far as is relevant here, the State Committee does not per-
form direct electoral functions. See Petn. 4 n. 4. 
RCW 29.42.020, quoted above, requires state committees 
the state's major parties to be composed~f two represen-
tatives from each of the state's~39 counties. Pursuant to this 
formula, the three most populous counties -- with more than 
50% of the state's population elect only 8% of the members 
of the State Committee, while 30 counties -- with only 23% of 
the population -- elect 77%. Thus a minority of party members 
in rural counties exercise principal control over the Washington 
Democratic Party between conventionso 
In 1976, the State Democratic Convention adopted a 
charter provision stipulating that the State Committee shall be 
composed of two representatives elected from each of the state's 
,r 
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39 counties and of one representat'ive elected from each 
of the state's 49 legislative districts. The result would 
be partly to even out the voting power of the counties' 
respective residents and, relatedly, to give residents of 
legislative districts a greater voice than they enjoyed under 
a system of county-wide elections. 
At the next meeting of the State Committee, the 
Committee refused to seat the newly elected district 
representatives, including four of appellants, on -the ground 
that RCW 29.42.020 forbade participation of more than two 
representatives from each county. Those appellants and four 
others -- including three party chairpersons for the three most 
populous counties in Washington and a county representative on 
the State Committee -- brought suit in state court against the 
State Committee and its chairman for a declaratory judgment. 
They argued that the state statute as applied to bar implemen-
tation of the Convention's charter provision and to bar four of 
the appellants from serving as committeepersons, impermissibly 
burdened appellants' rights of freedom of association. Another 
challenge, not pertinent here, . was also pressed. The state was 
served with a copy of the complaint but did not intervene or 
appear as amicus to defend the statute. The trial court granted 
summary judgment for appellants, reasoning that the "statute 
purports to control the inner workings of a voluntary political 




The Supreme Court of Washin'gton reversed, 
holding that '~CW 29.42.020 is not a substantial burden 
on plaintiffs' right of free association for political 
purposes." Petn. App. A-15. The court observed that the 
real inquiry wa~ whether the state law substantially im-
peded appellants' efforts to achieve the general stated 
objectives of the Democratic Party, reproduced in appendix 
hereto. The court found no such burden. The court expressed 
its view that this dispute was in actuality a factional dis-
pute within the Democratic Party, which was best resolved by 
"intraparty politicking." Petn. App. A-lSo Finally, the court 
acknowledged that charter provisions adopted by the Democratic 
State Convention are generally binding on the State Committee 
but held that the provision involved herein was not presumably 
because it was prohibited by a valid state law, namely, 
RCW 29.42.020. 
The four dissenting justic~s concluded that the state 
statute did impose a substantial burden on appellants' First 
Amendment rights and that a compelling state interest had not 
been adduced to substantiate the law. There was a burden even 
accepting the majority's own analytical framework because among 
the Democratic Party's stated objectives was the aim to "[admin-
ister the party organization in accordance with rules and standards 
which will facilitate achieving the goals of the party." Petn. 
Appo A-23. 
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3. CONTENTIONS: Appellants contend that the 
state law is unconstitutional in that it bars several of 
them from serving in their elected positions on the State 
Committee, and it nullifies each appellant's right as a 
party member to elect and be represented by a State Committee 
composed as directed by the State Party Conventiono 
Appellants purport to find support in this Court's 
decision in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975)o There the 
Court sustained a challenge to a state injunction forbidding 
59 persons from serving as party-approved delegates to the 
Democratic National Convention issued because they had not 
been selected in accordance with state lawo The injunction was 
held to constitute an insufficiently justified burden on the 
First Amendment rights of the delegates and the party generally. 
The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to an in-
junction forbidding the delegates from participating in a post-
convention caucus to select Illinois representatives to the 
Democratic National Committeeo 
Appellants also rely on strong language in Ripon 
Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (CA DC 1975) 
(~bane) cert denied, 424 UoS. 933 (1976), recognizing a "right 
not only to form political associations but to organize and di-
rect them in the way that will make them most effective." 525 F.2d 
at 585. Additional support is found in Fahey v. Darigan, 405 
F. Supp. 1386 (Do R.I. 1975), in which the court struck down a 




Appellants point out as well that the Washington 
S.Ct. gave inadequate consideration to a particular article 
of the party's charter listing "Basic Principles," two of 
which are clearly burdened by the state statute at issue. 
These principles include the propositions that all party 
members shall enjoy equal rights and opportunities in all 
proceedings of the party at all levels and that, in all 
elections in which party policy is determined or party of-
ficials elected, appropriate procedures shall provide for full 
and equal participation and fair, ·proportional representation. 
Appellees attempt to downplay the policymaking role 
of the State Committee. They allege, too, that the amounts 
of money raised and distributed have been small and have gone 
to the administration of the State Committee, payment of debts 
and distribution to Democratic Party candidates nominated to 
run for office. Appellees also suggest that appellants have not 
been seated in part because not all of the district representa-
tives have been elected, and it has been the consistent position 
of the State Committee not to seat any until all have been chosen. 
Appellees place some reliance on a provision of the party's 
charter that says when any part of the charter is in conflict 
with state statutes the latter will control. 
Appellees argue that the seminal freedom-of-association 
cases such as NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.So 449 (1958), dealt with 
state interference with the freedom of individuals to form groups, 
not state regulation of the internal structure of the groups that 
( 
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resulted. Appellees distinguish c'ousins on the ground 
that it involved a national convention and the nomination 
of national candidates. The issue here concerns state 
regulation of part of a state political party. Cousins 
dealt, moreover, with the advancement of ideas and the 
selection of candidates, functions supposedly not involved 
in the instant case. 
Appellees observe that Ripon Society simply held 
that the Equal Protection Clause did not mandate a one-person 
one-vote formula for delegates to the 1976 National Republican 
Convention, and thus is inapposite here on two counts: the 
constitutional issue involved was different and a national 
*I 
convention figured prominently in the situation there considered.-
The language in Ripon Society supporting appellants' position is, 
in appellees' view, overbroad dictum. Appellees do not attempt 
to distinguish Fahey, but contend that it was wrongly decided. 
Finally, appellees contend .that the state statute is 
justified as a measure designed to regularize the election process. 
The statute ensures that each major political party shall have an 
administrative body between state conventions, thus preserving the 
stability and integrity of the electoral process. Appellees point 
to the statutes of numerous states that have undertaken to regulate 
the composition of political party state committees. 
*I 
- Actually, the langua?e on which appellants rely was an important 
part of the Ripon court s analysis in regard to whether a party 





In reply, appellants generally attack appellees' 
attempt to establish that freedom of association does not 
encompass a state political party's internal ~overnance. 
They contend that even if the state has a compelling interest 
in maintaining stability in the electoral process, the state 
has not chosen the least restrictive means here. A require-
ment that there be a state committee with at least two persons 
per county would serve the interest of stability and any interest 
in ensuring that all areas of the state are represented. Six of 
the 30 states noted by appellees permit the state party itself 
to determine the composition of state committees. Several of 
these states use the "minimum but no maximum" approach. Twelve 
other states mandate a formula based on one-person one-vote 
principles (which everyone concedes is not constitutionally 
compelled under the circumstances of this case), which involves 
the substantial interest in ensuring equal representation. Twelve 
other states have laws similar to .Washington's, which in appellants · 
view makes this case even more significant. 
4. DISCUSS ION: There is some question in this case J-r 
whether the decision below rests on a nonconstitutional ground 1 
In the final section of its opinion, the court ruled that the 
charter provision at issue here is not binding on the State 
Committee, though the charter generally does govern the affairs 
of that committee. The dissenters pointed out that the majority's 
analysis rests on the general state-law principle that the charter 
governs absent the intervention of applicable statutory provisions, 
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and on the further assumption that the statute involved here 
is valid. The majority, of course, thought that the statute 
was valid and the dissenters disagreed. Thus, the ultimate 
question appears to be the constitutional one of the validity 
of RCW 29.42.020 insofar as it interferes with the internal 
governance of the party. 
As noted above, appellees point out that the charter 
itself provides that applicable state laws shall control over 
parts of the charter "found to be in conflict with such statutes." 
Motion to Affirm at 5 n. 2. The ·court below did not explicitly 
rely on this provision, however. Its holding of the nonbinding 
effect of the charter provision in dispute seems best explained 
by the theory of the dissenters, just discussed. Thus, it would 
appear that the only issue resolved by the court below and pre-
sented in this appeal is whether RCW 29.42.020 might constitu-
tionally bar the individual appellants' assumption of office and 
generally frustrate the implementation of the specific and recently 
enacted charter provision expanding the number of committee seats. 
That issue does not seem insubstantial. Though there is 
some dispute about just how important the State Committee really 
is, and though it concededly is less important than a national 
nominating convention in relation to the effective implementation 
of the Democratic Party's political objectives, the Committee does 
seem to have a substantial role in the ongoing maintenance of the 
state party organization. Indeed, that is the premise of the 
state's efforts to regulate the committee's internal operation, 
- 10 -
according to appellees • . To the extent that the Washington 
statute forces uneven representation, then, it would appear 
to have a substantial effect on the ability of party members 
to participate effectively in a significant aspect of party 
activity as well as a clear direct effect on persons elected 
under the charter provision designed to ensure fairer repre-
sentation. At least some inquiry into the magnitude and 
character of the state's interest would seem to be warranted. 
But the court below did not even reach that stage, being of the 
view that there was no cognizable burden on constitutional rights 
to begin with. Were that inquiry conducted, appellants' least-
restrictive-alternative analysis might well prevail. 
As an initial matter, it might prove useful to call 
for the views of the State of Washington on these issues. 
Evidently, the state has remained silent thus far. 
CFR Washington. There is a motion to affirm. 
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APPENDIX 
The purpose and objectives of the. Democratic Party as 
listed by the charter are: _________. 
1. Adopt and promote statements of policy to serve as 
standards for Democratic elected officials and goals for 
the people of the state. 
2. Nominate and assist in the election of Democratic 
candidates at all levels who support the goals of the· 
party. · · 
3. Administer the party organization in accordance with 
rules and standards which will facilitate achieving the 
goals of the party. 
4. Establish standards and rules of procedure to afford 
all members of the Democratic Party full, timely and 
equal . opportunities to participate in decisions con· 
cerning the selection of candidates, the formulation of 
policy, and the conduct of other party affairs without 
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, age (except 
where state and federal law precludes participation), 
religion, economic status or ethnic origin. 
5. Promote fair campaign practices and fair adjudication 
of disputes. 
6. Raise and disburse monies needed for the continuing 
operation of the Party. 
7. \Vork with elected Democratic public officials at all 
levels to achieve the goals of the Democ:atic Party. 
8. Encourage and support codes of political ethics gov-
erning ali public officials in the conduct of their offices. 
9. Encourage voter registration and voting. 
Charter of the Democratic Party· of \V ashington, art. 2, 
Purposes and Objectives (June 12, 1976). 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
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v. Chaney 
is an appeal from a decision of 
of Washington that sustains the validity 
of state code S 29.42.020, providing: 
"The state committee of each major political 
party shall consist of one committeeman and 
one committeewoman from each county elected 
by the county committee at its organization 
meeting." 
The State of Washington has regulated the 
composition of state committees of the major parties 
1909. I believe (though I am not certain) that 
here challenged has been on the books since 
~, Nevertheless, in 1976, the Washington State 
Democratic Convention adopted a charter provision that, 
addition to the two delegates per county, would increase 
committee membership by one additional member 
the state's forty-nine legislative districts. 
-
-- ~~<f;. 
Appellants in this case are persons who were 
from legislative districts pursuant to the 1976 
change in the democratic charter. Apparently they have 
beP.n allowed to participate as members of the 
because of the state statute"'!l · Accordingly, they instituted 
this suit • . Appellees include the State Democratic CommitteJ' 
Thus, this is a contest between individuals who 
have been elected - under the scheme ~adopted by the State 
Convention - ;:and the existirig State Democratic 
~ The challenge is based on an alleqed First 
Amendment denial of associational rights. The 
Supreme Court, 5-4, held that there 
burdening of such rights. 
1j,.· ···, Appellees point state has a 
interest in regulating the two major parties, that 
done so since 1909, and tha~ : the Democratic controlled 
legislature of the state has declined to change the 
at issue. 
I am inclined to think there is no burdening 
in any constitutionRl sense. 
:. 
2. 
"'') : The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
M-
Mr. Justice Stewart 
} 
Mr. Justtoe White 
tvVv ~r. Just i oe l!.9. rshall 
~ 
v .... . Ju~t :toe Blaokmun --- \!r. Ju~S t t ce Powell Mr. Ju,Jti ce Rehnquist 
~--' ~~~LJ ~ From : Mr. Juatioe Stevena 
~Circulated: MAY 16 1919 
~ ~ k ~~ulat~----
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-647 
Karen Marchioro et al., I 
Appellants, On Appeal from the Supreme Court. 
v. of Washington. 
Neale V. Chaney et al. 
[May -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opmwn of the Court. 
Since 1927 a Washington statute has required each major · 
political party to have a State Committee consisting of two 
persons from each county in the State.1 The question pre-
1 RCW 29.--42.020 provides: 
"State Committee. The state committee of Pach major political party 
shall consist of one committeeman and one committeewoman from each 
county elected by the county committee at its organization meeting. It 
shall have a chairman and vice-chairman who must be of oppoRite sexes. 
This committee shall meet during January of Pach odd-numbered year for 
the purpose of organization at a time a.nd plarP de~ignated by a sufficient 
notice to all the newly elected state committePmen and committeewomen 
by the authorized officers of the rPtiring committee. For the purpose of · 
this section a notice mailed at least one week prior to the date of the meet-
ing shall constitute sufficient notice. At its organizational mPeting it shall 
elect its chairman and vice-chairman, and such officers as its bylaws may 
provide, and adopt bylaws, rules and regulations. It shall have power to: 
"(1) Call conventions at such time and place and under such circum-
stances and 'for such purposes as the call to convention shall designate. 
The manner, number and procedure for selection of state convention dele-
gates shall be subject to the committee's rules and regulations duly · 
adopted; 
"(2) Provide for the election of delegates to national conventions; 
"(3) Fill vacancies on the ticket for any federal or state office to be · 
voted on by the electors of more than one county; 
" ( 4) Provide for the nomiljlation of presidential electors; and 
' I . • • .. 
.. 
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sented by this appeal is whether the Washington Supreme 
Court correctly held that this statute does not violate the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 
The powers of the Democratic State Committee are derived 
from two sources: the authorizing statute and the Charter of 
the Democratic Pa.rty of Washington. The statute gives the 
State Committee the power to call conventions, to provide for 
the election of delegates to na.tional conventions and for the 
nomination of presidential electors, and to fill vacancies on 
the party ticket. 
The principal activities performed by the State Committee 
are authorized by the Charter of the Democratic Party of 
Washington. The Charter provides that the State Commit.. 
tee shall act as the Party's governing body when the Conven-
tion is in adjournment.3 And it gives the State Committee 
authority to organize and administer the Party's administra-
tive apparatus, to raise and distribute funds to candidates, to 
conduct workshops, to instruct candidates on effective cam-
"(5) Perform all functions inherent in such an organization. 
"Notwithstanding any provision of this 1972 amendatory act, the commit-
tee shall not set rules which shall govern the conduct of the actual pro-
ceedings at a party state convention." 
Between 1909 and 1927 the statute provided for one member to be 
elected from each county. 
A "major political party" is defined as " ·'a political party of which at 
least one nominee for president, vice-president, United States senator, or a 
state-wide office received at least five percent of the total vote cast at the 
last preceding state general election in an even-numbered year ' " 
RCW 29.01.090. 
2 The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances." 
The freedom protected against federal encroachment by the First 
Amendment is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same pro-
tection from infringement by the States. William v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23r 
30-31. 
8 Charter, Art. IV (G) (1), App. 10 . . 
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paign procedures and organization, and generally to further 
the Party's objectives of influencing policy and electing its 
adherents to public office.4 
Under both Party rules and state law, the State Conven-
tion rather than the State Committee, is the governing body 
of the Party. The Charter explicitly provides that the Con-
vention is "the highest policy-making authority within the 
State Democratic Party" 5 And the State Supreme Court has 
unequivocally held that the "State convention of a major 
political party is the ultimate repository of State-wide author-
ity. . . . The State Convention is implicitly empowered to 
establish the permanent State organization of the party, 
crea.te committees, delegate authority, and promulgate, adopt, 
ratify, amend, repeal or enforce intra-party State-wide rules 
and regulations." 6 
In 1976 the State Democratic Convention adopted a Char-
ter amendment directing that the State Committee include 
members other than those specified by state statute. ·The 
Charter amendment provided that in addition to the two 
delegates from each of the State's 39 counties, there should 
be one representative elected from each of the State's 49 
legislative districts. Pursuant to this Charter amendment 
new legislative district representatives were elected to serve 
on the State Committee. At the January 1977 meeting 
of the State Committee, a motion to seat these newly elected 
representatives was ruled out of order, apparently in reliance 
on the statutory definition of the composition of the 
Committee.7 
4 Charter, Art. IV (0)(1), (2), (5), App. 10-11; Charter, Art. VII 
(C) (1), App. 19. 
i5 Charter, Art. V (F) . 
6 King County Republican Cent1'al Committee v. Republican State Com-
mittee, 79 Wn. 2d 202, 211-212, 484 P. 2d 387, 392 (1971). See also 
Ma1·chioro v. Chaney, 90 Wn. 2d 298, 313, 582 P. 2d 487, 496 (1978). 
7 An appeal from that ruling was defeated by a vote of 56 to 17. App~ 
4-5, 
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Thereafter, members and officers of the State Democratic 
Party, including four who had been elected as legislative 
district representatives, instituted this action for declaratory 
and injunctive relief in the King County Superior Court. 
Among their contentions was a claim that the statutory re-
striction on the composition of the Democratic State Commit-
tee violated their rights to freedom of association protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.8 
The Superior Court granted appellants' motion for a partial 
summary judgment. On appeal, a divided State Supreme 
Court reversed that part of the trial court's judgment that in-
validated the statutory definition of the central Committee.0 
The state court reasoned that although "substantial burdens" 
on the right to associate for political purposes are invalid 
unless "'essential to serve a compelling state interest,' " 10 
these appellants failed to establish that this statute had 
imposed any such burden on their attempts to achieve the 
objectives of the Democratic Party. Since this initial burden 
had not been met, the court upheld the constitutionality of 
the challenged statute. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, - U. S. -, and now 
affirm the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court. 
The requirement that political parties form central or 
county committees composed of specified representa.tives from 
8 Appellants also challenged the requirement of RCW 29.42.020 and .030 
that the two persons elected as county delegates be one man and one 
woman. Appellants argued that this requirement violates the Washing-
ton State Equal Rights Amendment, Wash. Const., Art. XXX. The 
Washington Supreme Court rejected the claim, 90 Wn. 2d, at 308, 582 P. 
2d, at -. Appellants do not seek review here of the "one man and one 
woman" requirements of the statute. Nor do they raise any claim based 
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See n. 16, 
infra. 
9 Mar-chioro v. Chaney, 90 Wn. 2d 298, 582 P. 2d 487 (1978). 
10 !d., at 309, 582 P. 2d, at 493, quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 
. 129. 
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each district is common in the laws of the States.11 These 
laws are part of broader election regulations that recognize 
the critical role played by political parties in the process 
11 In 22 States, political parties are required by state law to establish 
state central committees composed of an equal number of committee mem-
bers from each unit of representation. 
Sec Cal. Elec. Code§§ 8660, 9160 (Supp. 1978); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 103.111 
(Harrison 1975 & Supp. 1977); Idaho Code § 34.504 (Supp. 1977); Ind. 
Code Ann. § 3-1-2-1 (Burns 1972); IowH. Code Ann. § 43.111 (West Supp. 
1977); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25.3804 (Supp. 1976); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 52 
§ 1 (Law. Co-op. 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 168.597 (West 1967); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-1-3 (Supp. 1977); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 115.621 (Vernon 
Supp. 1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 23.3403 (Supp. 1977); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 293.153 (1975); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 19:5-4 (West 1964); N. D. 
Cent. Code § 16-17-11 (1971); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.03 (Page 
1972); S. C. Code § 7-9-90 (1976); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 12-5-16 
(1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-1304 (Supp. 1977); Tex. Elec. Code Ann., 
tit. 13, § 38 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 17, § 730 (1968); 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 29.42.020 (Supp. 1976); W. Va. Code § 3-1-9 
(Supp. 1978); Wyo. Stat. §§ 22-4-105-110 (1977). Election laws in five 
States establish state party central committees in which the number of 
committee members from each unit of representation bears a rough rela-
tionship to party membership. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-233 (West 
1975); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-14-108 (2) (Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 18:285 (1) (West 1969 & Supp. 1977); Ore. Rev. Stat.§ 248.075 (1977); 
Utah Code Ann. § 20-4-2 (1976). 
Political parties are required to establish county central committees com-
prised of an equal number of committee members from each unit of repre-
sentation by state law in 21 State. 
See Cal. Elec. Code §§ 8820--8825, 9320--9325 (West 1977) (limited to 
certain counties); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-14-1081 (1) (Supp. 1976); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 103.111 (Harrison 1975 & Supp. 1977); Idaho Code § 34-502 
(Supp. 1977); Ind. Code Ann. § 3-1-2-1 (Burns 1972); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 25-3802 (1973); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:285 (9) (Supp. 1978); Md. 
Ann. Code, art. 33, § 11-2 (Supp. 1977); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 52, §§ 2-4, 
2-9 (Law. Co-op. 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 168.599 (West 1967 & 
Supp. 1978); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-1-3 (Supp. 1977); Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§ 115.607 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 23-3401, 23-
3402 (Supp. 1977); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 19-5-3 (Supp. 1977); Ohio Rrv. 
Code Ann. § 3517.03 (Page 1972); S. C. Code § 7-9-60 (1976); S. D. 
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of selecting and electing candidates for state and national 
office. The State's interest in ensuring that this process is 
conducted in a fair and orderly fashion is unquestionably 
legitimate; "as a practical matter there must be a substantial 
regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and 
if some sort of order, rather than chaos. is to accompany the 
democratic process." Storer v. Braum, 415 U. S. 724, 730. 
That interest is served by a state statute requiring that a 
representative central committee be established, aud entrust-
ing that commitee with authority to perform limited func-
tions, such as filling vacancies on the Party ticket, providing 
for the nomination of presidential electors and delegates to 
national conventions, and calling statewide conventions. Such 
functions are directly related to the orderly participation of 
the political party in the electoral process. 
Appellants have raised no objection to the Committee's 
performance of these tasks. 12 Rather, it is the Committee's 
Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 12-5-13, 12-5-14 (1975 & Supp. 1977); Trx. Elec. 
Code Ann., tit. 13, § 18 (Vrrnon Supp. 1978); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 29.42.0:30 (Supp. 1976); W. Va. Code § 3-1-9 (Supp. 1978); Wis. Stat. 
Ann.§ 8.17 (Wrst 1967 & Supp. 1977). 
Sre Note, Equal Representation of Party Members on Political Party 
Central Committees, 88 YaJe L. J. 167, 168-169, and nn. 5-6 (1978) . 
u By appellants' own admission, t.he Committrr's electoral functions are 
performed rarely; moreover, when they are performed, they conform with 
Lhe one-person, one-vote principle. "Although the state committee on rate 
occasions performs certain ballot. acce~s function~, sec RCW 2!1.18.150 and 
29.42.020 (filling vacancies on c!"rtain party tickets a11d nominating presi-
dential elector~) and Wal:lh. Const., Art. II, § 15 (selectmg uominees for 
certain intPrim legislative positions), whrn it doe~ so it i~ constitutionally 
required to comply wit.h the principle of one-per~on, one-vole. Sre, e.g., 
Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F. 2d 308, 313-
314 (CA2 1972); Fahey v. Da.rigan, 405 F . Supp. 1386, 1392 (RI 1975) . 
The state committee has recognized this and has RtipuhLted to the entry 
of an injunction ordering that the state rommittee be : 
"enjoined from filling vacancies on the Democratic ticket for any federal 
or s1 ate office to be votl'd on by the elector::; of more than one county or 
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ather activities-those involving "purely internal party de-
cisions," Brief for Appellants, at 5 n. 11-that concern 
appellants and give rise to their constitutional attack on the 
statute. 
The Committee does play a significant role in internal 
party affairs: The appellants' description of its activities 
makes this clear : 
"Between state conventions, the Democratic State Com-
mittee is the statewide party governing body. It meets 
at least four times each year, exercises the party's policy-
making functions, directs the party's administrative 
apparatus, raises and distributes funds to Democratic 
candidates, conducts workshops to instruct candidates on 
effective campaign procedures and organization, and 
seeks generally to further the party's objectives of in-
fluencing policy and electiHg its adherents to public 
office. Insofar as is relevant here, the state committee 
is purely an internal party governing bouy.' ' Appellants 
Brief, at 4--5. 
:rone of these activities, howPver, is required by statute to 
be performed by the Committee. 1" With respect to each, the 
electing Democratic nominres for interim legislative appointments to 
represent multi-county district::; by any method that contravene" the one-
person, one-vote rule. Cunningham v. Washington State Democratic 
Comm., Civ. No. C75-901 (WD Wa.;;h., permanent injunction entered 
Nov. 28, 1977) . 
" As a result of this injunction, RCW 29.42.020-which rc::;ultR in gross 
deviations from om•-person, onr-vote--ha:,; bern supPr~Pded msofar as 
applied to the state committee when it performs electoral funct10ns." Brief 
for Appellants, at. 4 n. 11. 
13 ln addition to its enumerated funct.iom:, t.lw Comm1tteP IR authorized 
by RCW 29.42.020 to "[p~lerform all function~ inherent in Huch an or-
gamzatwn." Sr<' n. 1, supra. The CommittP<''s rolr m mt<'rnal party af-
fair~, howevrr, JS clear!~· not " inherent" in it::; performance of thP limited 
electoral function~ authorizPd by !:itatute. 
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source of the Committee's authority is tho Charter adopted by 
the Democratic Party.11 
In short, all of the "internal party decisions" which appel-
lents claim should not be made by a statutorily composed 
Committee arc made not because of anything in the statute, 
but because of delegations of authority from the Conve11tion 
itself. Nothing in the statuto required the Party to authorize 
such decisiomnaking by tho Committee; as far as the statu-
tory scheme is concerned, there is no reason why the Cou-
ventiou could not have created a new committee composed 
of members of the State Committee and such additional mem-
bership as might be desired to perform the political functions 
now performed by the State Committee. Tho fact that it 
did not choose such an alternative course is hardly the re-
sponsibility of the state legislature. 
The answer to appellants' claims of a substantial burden 
on First Amendment rights, then. turns out to be a simple 
one. There can be no cornplaint that the Party's right to 
govern itself has been substantially burdened by statute when 
the source of the complaint is the Party's own decision to 
confer critical authority 011 the State Committee. The 
elected legislative representatives who claim that they have 
been unable to participate in the intemal policymaking of the 
Committee should address their complaint to the Party which 
has chosen to entrust those tasks to the Committee, rather 
14 Indeed, it IS the Charter provisionR. ratlwr than the Rtalr tatute, 
which appellants themselves Cite as authorit~· for tiH:ir desmpt10n of the 
Committrr activitirs at issue lwre. Sec Brief for AppcllantH, at 4 nn. 
5-10. Thus, it iK Art. IV (G) (1) of the Chartt'r which provides that the 
Committee• IS the statewide govrrning body, shall rmse fund~ for candi-
dates, and shall rxerrise the Party's pohrymakiug functiOn~. And It IS 
subsection (2) of that :-;amc Artiri<=' which authorize:> thC' Committer to 
direct the Party':; admim:;tratJve ap1111ratu~. while ~ub~ertion (5) require8 
it to meet at least four hmC'S per ymr. Finally, thr "ource of thr Com-
mJttrc':; autbonty to conduct work~hops for randidatr.s i::; founrl in Art. 
VII (C) ( 1) of the Charter. 
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than to the state legislature. IllstRad of persuading us that 
this is a case in which a state statute has imposed substantial 
burdens on the Party's right to govem its affairs, appellants' 
own statement of the facts establishes that it is the Party's 
exercise of that very right that is the source of whatever 
burdens they suffer.1 5 
The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court is affirmed. 
15 Cousin.s v. W1goda. 419 U. S. 477, upon which a.ppellanti:i place their 
primary reliance, does not Hllpport their claim here. In Cousins, unlike 
thi~ ra::;e, there wa::; a :mb;;tantial burdrn on a~><oriationnl fr('Pdom~. Tlu~ 
fact alone rlistinguishe;; tlw two cmws, and renders Cou..~ins inappo~ite. 
Moreover, in Cousins it wa::; empha::;ized that the Stat€' waH attempting to 
regulate the National Party, who~e activities transcend the borders and 
particular interc~t" of any ~ingle State. !d., at 409. Finally, Ill Cousins 
there was no disJJute as to the right of the Democratic Part~· to decide 
which delegatr~ should be permitted to participate: it wa.~ ron ceded by the 
respondents there, and emJ)hasized in all of the opiuions, that '· ( t) he con-
vention wa~ undrr no obligation to sl:'at " thr drlegation e]pcted in accord-
ance with state law. !d., at 488; 491-492 (REHNQUIWJ', .T., concurring); 
496 (PowELL, .T., concurring in part and diHsenting in part) . Here, on the 
other hand, the Party's right to decide who may sit on the State Com-
mittee is the i~suc. The Washington Supreme Court hm: hrld that regard-
less of what the Part~· might wi~h, the Committee ma~' uot include any 
members other than those specified b~· ~tatute. That i;; the law of the 
State; the only frderal queHtion lH whether that law violates tlw Fir::>t 
Amendment. 
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